In
view of the COVID-19 pandemic and the mandatory social distancing norms in
place, Companies may be facing some practical difficulties in some of the
compliances with the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”). The Ministry of Corporate Affairs
(“MCA”), on its part, has taken several steps for easing such difficulties.
By
way of examples, the mandatory period for holding of an Annual General Meeting
where the financial year ended on 31.12.2019 has been extended,
suitable amendments have been made to the procedure for calling and holding of
Extraordinary General Meetings and of passage of resolutions at such meetings,
and the application of similar relaxations to the holding of AGMs recently.
The
non-compliance of some of the obligations under the Act constitutes an offence
punishable with fine and/or imprisonment. The Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”)
imposes several obligations upon a Company post its incorporation, which
obligations are required to be complied with in a timebound manner. The non-compliance
of some of the obligations is an offence, which results in punishment either in
the form of fines/ penalties and/or imprisonment of the officers in default. As
in criminal jurisprudence, so also in Company Law, the offences can be
categorized as ‘compoundable’ and ‘non-compoundable’. Section 441 of the Act
confers the power of compounding of certain offences upon the authorities under
the Act. This provision is a successor to Section 621A in the erstwhile
Companies Act, 1956 which introduced the power of composition pursuant to a
recommendation of the Sachar Committee.
In
view of the aforementioned recent developments, we have analysed the law and
the judicial trends in the matter of compounding of offences under the Act as
under:
Which Offences under the Act are Compoundable under Section 441?
As
per Section 441 of the Act, an offence under the Act for which the punishment
is fine only is compoundable by the Regional Director or any other officer
authorized in that behalf by the Central Government, in case the maximum amount
of fine that may be imposed does not exceed Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs. The
Tribunal, i.e. the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), has the power to
compound any offence irrespective of the amount of fine that may be imposed
under the provision. In Pahuja Takii Seeds Limited & Ors. v. Registrar
of Companies, NCT of Delhi and Haryana and Others,
the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) clarified the position
that the NCLT is empowered to compound the offence irrespective of the amount
of fine specified by the Act for the offence. That is to say, while the
Regional Director or any other officer authorized by the Central Government has
a limited power of compounding, the power of the NCLT is unlimited, once the
other conditions in the Act are satisfied.
The
power of compounding of the aforesaid offences has been conferred on the
aforementioned authorities notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (“CrPC”).
Who can prefer an Application for Compounding under Section 441?
Both,
the company as well as the officers in default who are liable for commission of
the offence (as per the applicable provisions of the Act), may prefer an
application for compounding. In Pahuja Takii Seeds (supra) a bench of
three members of the NCLAT answered the question as to whether a combined
application could be preferred by the companies and the officers in charge. The
NCLT in the judgment under appeal had held that a combined application was not
maintainable. The NCLAT reversed the aforesaid view and held that there was no
bar under the Act against preferring a joint application by the company with
the officers in default.
When can an Application for Compounding of an Offence be preferred?
An
Application for compounding can be preferred before or after initiation of
prosecution for the offence. Section 441(3)(b) provides for notice for
compounding of any offence to be given to the Registrar of Companies (“RoC”)
within seven days of the order of compounding.
If an
application for compounding is allowed, and an offence is compounded before the
institution of any prosecution, Section 441(3)(c) prohibits the initiation of
prosecution in relation to such offence, either by the RoC or by any
shareholder of the company or by any person authorised by the Central
Government against the offender in relation to whom the offence is so
compounded. Similarly, if an offence is compounded after initiation of
prosecution, the Registrar of Companies shall bring to the notice of the court
in which the prosecution is pending the fact of such compounding, and on such
notice of the compounding of the offence being given, the company or its
officer in relation to whom the offence is so compounded shall be discharged.
In Shri
Subhinder Singh Prem v. Union of India through RoC,
the NCLAT reversed the decision of the NCLT and upheld the argument of the
Appellant therein to the effect that the pendency of cases initiated by the
SFIO could not be a ground for rejection of the request for compounding.
Which Offences under the Act are not Compoundable?
As
per Section 441(6) of the Act, the offences for which the punishment is
imprisonment only or is imprisonment and also fine, are not compoundable
notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC. This means the offence may not
be compounded by the NCLT or any officer under the Act, or even by any other
person empowered under the CrPC to compound offences for which the punishment
is one of the aforesaid.
Prior
to its amendment by Section 39 of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 (“2019 Amendment”)
[which provision came into force on 2.11.2018], Section 441(6) read as follows:
“(6)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2
of 1974),— (a) any offence which is punishable under this Act, with
imprisonment or fine, or with imprisonment or fine or with both, shall be
compoundable with the permission of the Special Court, in accordance with the
procedure laid down in that Act for compounding of offences;
(b) any offence
which is punishable under this Act with imprisonment only or with imprisonment
and also with fine shall not be compoundable.”
In M/s
Cinepolis India Pvt. Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies, NCT of Delhi &
Haryana, New Delhi,
the question that arose before the NCLAT was as to whether the offences under
Sections 92, 137, 96 and 129 of the Act were compoundable. Upon an examination
of the provisions, it was found that except Section 96 (i.e. violation of
Section 96, for which the punishment was provided in Section 99) all other
provisions were those for which imprisonment was provided as a punishment in
the alternative. Section 96 read with Section 99 was the only provision which
provided only fine as the punishment. Thus, it was held that the offence under
Section 99 could be compounded by the NCLT under Section 441.
The
rest of the provisions were those which provided for punishment of imprisonment
in the alternative. The NCLAT referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in VLS
Finance v. Union of India
which had dealt with a similar question under Section 621A (predecessor to
Section 441, as it then stood) and wherein it was held that there was no
prohibition to compounding offences which were punishable with imprisonment in
the alternative. Thus, the NCLAT held that the offences under Sections 92, 137
and 129 were compoundable by the NCLT. Having noticed that there were no
proceedings pending before the Special Court, the NCLAT held that the NCLT
could proceed to compound the offence without any reference to the Special
Court.
In Cisco
Video Technologies India Private Limited,
compounding of offence under Section 186 of the Act was sought before the NCLT,
Bengaluru Bench. The punishment prescribed therein was one of fine on the
Company, and of imprisonment of the officers in default. An ingenious argument
came to be advanced, viz., that although imprisonment as well as fine were
provided as punishment, the offence insofar as the Company is concerned may be
compounded on a ‘stand-alone basis’, since the Company was not liable for the
punishment of imprisonment in terms of the provision. The argument was rejected
by the NCLT, and the application was permitted to be withdrawn.
In Karthikeya
Paper & Boards Limited & 2 Ors. v. Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu,
the offence committed was under Section 92(5) of the Act for failure to file
annual return and the punishment prescribed under the said provision was one of
imprisonment and also fine. On a request for compounding having been made, and
based on a report of the RoC, the NCLT Chennai permitted compounding of the
offence and reduced the fine imposed by the RoC. On an appeal being preferred
by the Company and the Directors against the order of the NCLT (praying for
further reduction of fine), the NCLAT raised the issue of jurisdiction of the
NCLT to compound the offence in view of the bar in Section 441(6). The NCLAT
found that the offence in question could not have been compounded except with
the prior permission of the Special Court.
Section
441(6) was substituted by the following, vide the 2019 Amendment:
“(6) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, any offence which is
punishable under this Act with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also
with fine shall not be compoundable.”
Thus,
while the absolute prohibition on compounding of offences which were punishable
with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also fine was continued, the
requirement of permission of the Special Court for compounding of offences which
were punishable with imprisonment in the alternative was done away with.
Section
441(7) is also of relevance in this regard. It states that the offences
compoundable under Section 441, may be compounded only in the manner set out in
Section 441 itself, and in no other manner. This absolutely clarifies that
compounding of any offence under the Act (other than those for which punishment
is imprisonment, or both imprisonment and fine) may only be permitted by the
Tribunal or the Regional Director or any other officer appointed by the Central
Government (as the case may be) in the manner set out in Section 441.
What
are the Other Conditions laid down by the Act for a Request for Compounding to
be considered?
The
third proviso to Section 441(1) lays down that an application for compounding
cannot be entertained if an investigation against the Company has been
initiated or is pending on the date of such application. An investigation into
the affairs of the Company is provided under Chapter XIV of the Act.
Section
441(2) prohibits a request for compounding of an offence by a company or person
for a period of three years from the date on which a previous similar offence
committed by that company or person has been compounded in terms of Section
441. The express intention of the legislature in enacting this provision is to
prevent ‘repeat offenders’ from drawing the benefit of this provision. The
Explanation to the provision clarifies that a subsequent offence committed
after the expiry of three years from the date of compounding of the first
offence, shall be deemed to be a first offence for the purposes of Section
441(2).
Factors considered and extent of compounding in some decided cases
In Viavi
Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Registrar of Companies, NCT Delhi and
Haryana,
the NCLAT laid down certain factors which ought to be considered by the NCLT
while considering a request for compounding. These are as follows:
(i)
The
gravity of offence;
(ii)
The
act is intentional or unintentional;
(iii)
The
maximum punishment prescribed for such offence, such as fine or imprisonment or
both fine and imprisonment.
(iv)
The
report of the Registrar of Companies.
(v)
The
period of default.
(vi)
Whether
petition for compounding is suo moto before or after notice from Registrar of
Companies or after imposition of the punishment or during the pendency of a
proceeding.
(vii)
The
defaulter has made good of the default.
(viii)
Financial
condition of the company and other defaulters.
(ix)
Offence
is continuous or one-time.
(x)
Similar
offence earlier committed or not.
(xi)
The
act of defaulters is prejudicial to the interest of the member(s) or company or
public interest or not.
(xii)
Share
value of the company, etc.
In
the same decision, the NCLAT broadly allowed compounding of the offences upon
payment of approximately 1/5th of the maximum fine prescribed. This
has broadly been followed by the NCLTs in the country thereafter.
An
interesting observation of the NCLT Bench at New Delhi in In Re: UW
International Training and Education Centre for Health Pvt. Ltd.
begs mention at this stage. In this case (decided after the NCLAT decision in Viavi),
the RoC, in its report had recommended a fine of the minimum amount prescribed
by the provision in question, as the amount payable for compounding of the
offence. The NCLT opined that “The calculation recommended by the RoC is by
way of imposition of penalty on prosecution holding the defaulter guilty. Under
such circumstances, the sentencing provided under the Act cannot be below the
minimum. However, the principle of imposing minimum fine on compounding matters
is not mandatory, as compounding of an offence can be accepted by a Court even
by admonishing the defaulter or issuing a warning”.
In Deccan
Chronicle Holdings Limited & Ors. v. Registrar of Companies, Hyderabad
the NCLAT considered an appeal from a decision of the NCLT Hyderabad Bench
rejecting an application for compounding of the offence under Section 297 of
the Companies Act, 1956. In case of a Company having a paid up share capital of
Rupees One Crore or more, the said provision mandated previous approval of the
Central Government for entering into any contracts in which the Directors of
the Company were interested. The offence having been committed, an application
for compounding came to be filed. The NCLT rejected the application as
premature, on the ground that the approval of the Central Government had not
been taken for the contract in question prior to filing of the application for
compounding. The NCLAT reversed the decision of the NCLT while observing: “In
these cases, as it is admitted that while entering into interested transaction
prior approval of the Central Government as required under sub-section (1) of
Section 297 of Companies Act 1956 has not obtained, the question of obtaining
post facto approval does not arise. Once it is alleged and accepted that the
company or directors (appellants herein) have made interested party transaction
without prior approval of the Central Government, which attracts penal action,
the petition under Section 621A of the Act 1956 (now Section 441 of the Act
2013) is maintainable. The Tribunal cannot abdicate its power and jurisdiction
of condonation of punishment, if permitted under law by asking the party to
obtain the approval of the Central Government.”
In In
Re: Reddy Veeranna Constructions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,
the Bengaluru Bench of the NCLT compounded the offence of delay in holding of
an AGM upon payment of 10% of the total penal amount as compounding fee. The
NCLT found merit in the submission of the Company that the delay was due to
change in the software program in the accounts department and delay in the
functional process of software installed during the financial year and also
recruitment related issues.
Power of NCLT to review its decision under Section 441
In APC
Credit Rating Pvt. Ltd. v. ROC, NCT of Delhi and Haryana
the NCLAT was called upon to examine whether the NCLT was empowered to review
its decision rendered under Section 441 of the Act. In this case, the
applications for compounding filed by the Appellant therein was dismissed by
the NCLT. The Appellant therein preferred applications under Rule 154 of the
NCLT Rules 2016 praying for a review of the decisions on the ground that the
NCLT had failed to consider the NCLAT decision in Viavi (supra). The
applications for review also came to be rejected for lack of jurisdiction.
The
NCLAT upheld the orders of the NCLT while holding that Rules 11, 154 and 155 of
the NCLT Rules relied upon by the Appellant did not confer a power of review on
the NCLT. Further, it was held that the case also did not fall in the category
of ‘mistake apparent on the face of the record’ which is the basis for exercise
of power under Section 420(2) of the Act by the NCLT.
General Circular No. 18/2020 dated
21.4.2020
General Circular No. 17/2020 dated
13.4.2020
General Circular No. 20/2020 dated
5.5.2020
Report of the High-Powered Expert
Committee on Companies and MRTP Acts, August 1978
Company Appeal (AT) No. 80 of 2018
and connected matters, decided on September 27, 2018
Company Appeals (AT) No. 101 to 105
of 2017 decided on 17.5.2017
Company Appeal (AT) No. 137 of 2017
decided on 29.8.2017
C.P. No. 31/2017 decided on
31.7.2017
Company Appeals (AT) No. 240-241 of
2018 decided on 26.7.2018
Company Appeal (AT) Nos. 49 to 53 of
2016 decided on 28.2.2017
C.P. No. 16/59/2017 decided on
11.5.2017
Company Appeal (AT) Nos. 38 to 42 of
2016 decided on 28.2.2017
C.P. No. 8/2017 decided on 31.5.2017
Company Appeal (AT) No. 206 and 221
of 2017 decided on 19.7.2017