This decision on the interpretation of provisions of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“I&BC”) examined primarily two
questions:
(i)
Whether the
scheme of the Code contemplates that the sum forming part of the resolution
plan should match the liquidation value or not?
(ii)
Whether
Section 12-A is the applicable route through which a successful resolution
applicant can withdraw the proposed resolution plan
The case arose out of an Order of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) whereby the NCLAT had interfered with
a duly approved resolution plan of the Appellant on the ground that the plan
did not provide for equitable treatment of the operational and financial
creditors and that the plan was approved at a value which was lower than the
liquidation value determined by the valuers appointed under the I&BC.
The Court held on the first question that no part of
the I&BC or the Regulations thereunder mandated the resolution applicant to
meet the liquidation value determined in accordance with the applicable
regulations. While acknowledging that the release of assets of the Corporate
Debtor at a value which was less than the liquidation value of the corporate
debtor may appear inequitable, it was held that considerations of equity ought
to give way to the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors in approving
the plan. The view of the Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar
Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta was relied upon to arrive at this
conclusion.
On the second question, it was held that Section 12
A of the I&BC could not be relied upon by the resolution applicant to
withdraw from the proceedings. It was held that the said provision was
applicable only to the Applicant under Sections 7, 9 and 10 of the I&BC.
The Court, however, refrained from judicial examination of the issue as to
whether a successful resolution applicant could at all withdraw from the
resolution process or not.
1.
Nirmal
Kumar Parsan v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 7863 of 2009
decided on 21.1.2020]
In this case, the Supreme Court examined the
question as to whether the sale of goods imported from a foreign country, after
unloading the same in West Bengal and kept in the bonded warehouse (without
payment of customs duty) to foreign bound ships as “ship stores” can be
regarded as sake within the territory of West Bengal and therefore amenable to
sales tax under the State’s Sales Tax enactments.
The contention of the assessee was that the sale was
one in the course of import, on account of the fact that the process of import
was not complete at the time of sale to the foreign bound ship as ship stores.
It was urged that it being a sale in the course of import, it was not subject
to levy of local Sales tax by the State of West Bengal due to the
Constitutional limitation under Article 286 read with Section 5 of the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956.
On a thorough examination of the case law on the
subject, the Hon’ble Court was pleased to hold that in order to constitute
sales in the course of import, three essential conditions ought to be met,
viz., the existence of a sale, the actual import of goods, and the sale itself
being part and parcel of the import. It was found that the facts in the present
case did not demonstrate that the sale caused import of goods. Thus, the
argument of the assessee was rejected.
2.
Surinder
Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal & Ors. v. Virender Gandhi & Anr.
[Criminal Appeal Nos. 1936-1963 of
2019 decided on 8.1.2020]
The question agitated before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court was regarding applicability of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 (inserted with effect from 1.9.2018 by the Amendment Act 20 of 2018).
The said provision provides for deposit of a minimum of 20% of the fine or
compensation imposed upon the accused on conviction in a case under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in an appeal filed against the conviction.
The question sought to be raised was as to whether
the provision applied to proceedings initiated after the date of amendment or
whether it applied retrospectively even to complaints filed prior to the said
amendment. The Supreme Court relied on its decision in Crl. Appeal No. 917-944
of 2019, incidentally between the same parties, and reiterated the position
that Section 148 applied retrospectively to cases of complaints filed prior to
the amendment.
3.
Anuradha
Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors.
[W.P.(C) No. 1031 of 2019 and
connected matters decided on 10.1.2020]
In this case, the Supreme Court heard and disposed
off a batch of writ petitions challenging the restrictions imposed by the Union
Government on internet, mobile and fixed line telecommunication services in the
Jammu and Kashmir. While adjudicating upon the correctness of the restrictions
imposed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the right to freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to carry on any trade or
business under Article 19(1)(g) using the internet is constitutionally
protected.
Neither was it argued before the Court, nor was it
so held by the Court, that the right of access to internet is a fundamental
right. Further, the Hon’ble Court held that an indefinite suspension of
internet under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency
or Public Services) Rules, 2017 was also impermissible. Further, that such an
order was also subject to judicial review.
4.
H.P.
Puttaswamy v. Thimamma & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 3975 of 2020
decided on 24.1.2020]
In this case, while interpreting Section 32 of the
Registration Act, 1908 the Supreme Court held that the fact that the purchaser
in a sale deed was not present for registration of the sale deed before the
Registrar, was not determinative of the genuineness of the sale deed. The Court
based its conclusion on Section 32, which specified the categories of persons
who could present the document for registration before the appropriate
registrar’s office.
5.
Om
Pal Singh v. Disciplinary Authority & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 176 of 2020
decided on 14.1.2020]
In this case, the Appellant was an employee of a
Regional Rural Bank who was dismissed from service after following the
procedure set out in the service rules of the said Bank. The charges levelled
by the Bank against the Appellant were held to have been proved on evidence,
and the findings of the inquiry were upheld upto the High Court through several
rounds of challenges by the Appellant. During the inquiry, the Appellant was
placed under suspension for a period of 9 years. Upon an appeal against the
Appellant against the order of dismissal from service, the Appellant succeeded
and the punishment of dismissal from service was modified and reduced to
reduction in pay scales.
The Appellant claimed entitlement to salary for the
period of suspension in view of the reduction in the punishment.
The Hon’ble Court held that a
mere reduction in the quantum of punishment did not amount to an exoneration of
the Appellant from the charges framed by the Bank. The Appellant’s conviction
had been confirmed throughout. The question of consequential benefits flowing
from an order of reinstatement was to be decided by the Disciplinary Authority
itself, and consequential benefit could not be said to be an automatic
entitlement of the Appellant. The Supreme Court relied upon the decision in J.K.
Synthetics v. K.P. Agrawal to hold thus.
6.
Shri
Uttam Chand (D) Through LRs. v. Nathu Ram (D) Through LRs & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 190 of 2020
decided on 15.1.2020]
In this case, in a civil suit for possession based
on title, the High Court had found favour with the case of the defendant that
the defendant had become owner of the suit property by adverse possession
(under Article 65 of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963).
This, despite the fact that the defendant had denied the ownership of the
plaintiff itself. The Supreme Court examined in detail the precedents on the
concept of ‘adverse possession’, from which the following principles emerged:
(a)
Adverse
possession is hostile possession by assertion of a hostile title in denial of
the title of the true owner;
(b)
A plea of
adverse possession if premised on the fact that the true owner is the person
against whom the said plea is urged;
(c)
A person
claiming adverse possession must be able to plead and prove facts as to his/her
date of entering upon possession, the nature of his possession, the fact of his
possession being known to the other party, the period for which the adverse
possession has continued, and that the possession was open and undisturbed.
In the facts of the case, since the defendant had
denied the title of the plaintiff, it was held that the plea of adverse
possession could not be urged by the defendant.
7.
M/s
Pawan Hans Limited & Ors. v. Aviation Karmachari Sanghatana & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 353 of 2020
decided on 17.1.2020]
Vide this decision, the Supreme Court held that the
contractual employees of the Appellant Company are entitled to Provident Fund
benefits under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 (“EPF Act”) and the Employees Provident Fund Scheme 1952 (EPF Scheme)
framed thereunder.
The Central Government owned 51% stake in the
Appellant Company, while 49% was owned by ONGC. Further, the Appellant Company
had framed and notified the Pawan Hans Employees Provident Fund Trust
Regulations for giving provident fund benefits to all its employees. It was
argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of the aforesaid two facts that the
Appellant Company was thus exempt from the provisions of the EPF Act on account
of having satisfied the conditions for exemption under Section 16(1)(b) of the
Act. On the first test laid down in that provision, viz., ownership and control
of Government, the Appellant was found to be qualified for an exemption.
As regards the second test, it was found that
neither were the Company’s Trust Regulations in accordance with the requirement
of Section 16(1)(b) [i.e. a Scheme for benefit of contributory provident fund
or old age pension framed by the Central or State Government], nor did the
definition of employees under the said Trust Regulations include contractual
employees.
It was held, based on the decision in Regional
Provident Fund Commissioner v. Sanatan Dharam Girls Secondary School, that
both the aforesaid tests ought to have been qualified for availing the
exemption. One of the two tests not having been satisfied in the present case,
the Appellant was held to be covered by the EPF Act.
8.
National
Insurance Company Limited v. Birender and Anr.
[Civil Appeal Nos. 242-243 of 2020
decided on 13.1.2020]
In this decision, the Hon’ble Court reiterated the
view that ‘legal representatives’ of the deceased person could move an
application to seek compensation by virtue of Section 166(1)(c) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. The Court rejected the argument of the insurance company to
the effect that major, married sons of the deceased who were gainfully
employed, ought not to be entitled to claim compensation under this provision.
9.
Padum
Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[Criminal Appeal No. 87 of 2020]
In an important decision on the opinion of
handwriting experts while examining allegations of forgery, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reiterated that the opinions of handwriting experts (or any other kind of
expert evidence) could not be the sole determining factor upon which the
conclusion of the Court could be based in a trial. The existence of
corroborative direct or circumstantial evidence was also an additional factor
to be considered by the Court.
10.
Chowgule
and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Goa Foundation & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No. 839 of 2020 and
connected matters decided on 30.1.2020]
In this batch of cases, the Supreme Court examined
the correctness of a judgment of the High Court of Bombay at Goa, whereby the
High Court had quashed a decision of the State Government of Goa permitting the
mining companies which had mined iron ore between 7.2.2018 (being the date of
decision of the Supreme Court in Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Limited and
Ors.) and 15.3.2018 (being the date upto which the respondents in the
aforesaid decision had been permitted ‘to manage their affairs’ prior to a
complete prohibition on mining activity), to pay royalty and transport the ore
mined in this aforementioned period.
The Court held that the decision in Goa
Foundation could not be read to prohibit the transportation of royalty paid
ore which was mined during the period between 7.2.2018 and 16.3.2018. The Court
also placed reliance on Rule 12(1)(gg) of the Minerals (Other than Atomic and
Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 in support of its
decision.
